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 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS 
AND CHANGING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN 
THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE 
 
Owen E. Herrnstadt

 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
International labor groups seek innovative ways to change corporate 
behavior toward social responsibility. One method used to achieve this 
objective is negotiated international framework agreements (IFAs), also 
referred to as global framework agreements, between organizations 
represented by labor unions and multi-national corporations. To date, 
nearly eighty of these agreements have been executed, roughly thirty of 
them in the past five years.
1
 This article elaborates on my previous research 
regarding why framework agreements are negotiated and the elements that 
must be incorporated for them to be successful.
2
 It also reviews two 
negotiated agreements and subsequent challenges that resulted from union 
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1
 See generally Framework Agreements, GLOBAL COUNCIL OF UNIONS (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2013) http://www.global-unions.org/framework-agreements (providing a list 
of international framework agreements organized by global union federation and  by 
company).   International  agreements can take other forms, such as the Joint 
Memorandum  of Understanding on Fire and Building Safety for clothing  suppliers in 
Bangladesh; http://www.workersrights.org/linkeddocs/Bangladesh%20Fire%20and% 
20Building%20Safety%20MOU-%20Nov%202012.pdf. 
2
 See Part I (explaining how IFAs have proven to be more effective than codes of 
conduct) and Part II (arguing that IFAs require certain elements in order to be 
successful); see also Owen E. Herrnstadt, Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: 
What is Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349 (2001) [hereinafter Voluntary Codes]; Owen E. 
Herrnstadt, Are International Framework Agreements A Path To Corporate Social 
Responsibility ?, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 187 (2007) [hereinafter referred to as 
Path]. 
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organizing efforts.
3
  
 
I. WHY INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS? 
 
Today corporate social responsibility programs constitute a multi-billion 
dollar a year industry. Many of these programs have been created, shaped, 
and implemented by outside consultants and specialists. Entire corporate 
departments also are devoted to developing and implementing social 
responsibility programs.  Frequently, these corporate social responsibility 
programs are reflected in codes of conduct that include standards relating to 
business ethics, environmental concerns, and employee relations.   
While the purpose in establishing unilaterally implemented corporate 
social responsibility programs vary, they are often the result of efforts to 
repair a company’s tarnished public image. For example, Nike and a 
number of other companies have been targets of negative consumer 
campaigns after incidents involving the mistreatment of workers were 
reported.
4
 These companies found themselves embarrassed and faced 
boycott threats. Codes of conduct presented a solution for responding to 
critics and avoiding future problems.    
Corporate codes of conduct, however, do not placate all groups. Many 
have been heavily criticized by organized labor. These critics argue that 
corporate codes of conduct are public relations efforts more intended to 
placate “conscience-laden consumers” than they are to actually change 
corporate behavior with respect to workers’ rights—a key area of corporate 
social responsibility.
5
 
 Codes of conduct often are criticized because they are unilaterally 
developed, implemented, and enforced by companies with no input or 
participation by the workers they are intended to help.
6
 In addition, codes 
are criticized because many do not specify which workers they apply to or 
how they will be implemented and enforced. Others contain only 
ambiguous content.
7
 Without these essential elements, critics argue that 
codes lack legitimacy with workers and have little possibility of success in 
changing corporate behavior when it comes to honoring international labor 
standards, a true benchmark for measuring corporate social responsibility.   
                                                          
3
 See infra Part III (critically examining the Siemens International Framework 
Agreement and its effectiveness in a labor challenge that arose involving the company) 
and Part IV(critically examining IKEAs International Framework Agreement and its 
role during a union organizing campaign).  
4
 Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam is Called Unsafe, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 1987, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/08/business/nike-shoe-
plant-in-vietnam-is-called-unsafe-for-workers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
5
 Path, supra note 2, at 188; see also  Voluntary Codes, supra note 2, at 350. 
6
 Voluntary Codes, supra note 2, at 187-188. 
7
 Id. 
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One response to the criticisms of unilaterally implemented codes has 
been the development of IFAs. These agreements attempt to address two 
different but related goals. First, they are a response to non-negotiated, 
unilateral codes of conduct that do not reflect workers’ input, and are 
inherently unable to advance the goal of corporate social responsibility. 
Second, they are a response to the shortcomings of national labor and 
employment laws with respect to fundamental human rights.
8
 Global 
framework agreements differ from corporate codes of conduct because, 
“they are a product of negotiations between organized labor and the 
company.”9 They include the workers’ perspectives and “attempt to remedy 
the content and procedural deficiencies associated with [unilaterally 
implemented] codes.”10   
Negotiating a framework agreement between a global company and 
workers across the globe is not an easy task. It takes a powerful union in 
the home country of the corporation that has a good relationship with the 
multi-national corporation. It also takes a global network of unions that 
represent workers for the corporation in different parts of the world. Of 
course, negotiating an IFA also takes corporations that are willing to 
discuss these matters with labor organizations. With few exceptions, this 
means corporations who are experienced in engaging in social dialogue 
with unions.  As a consequence, most IFAs have been negotiated between 
European-based multi-national corporations and European unions and 
works councils.
11
 The fact that most IFAs are European-based is not 
surprising: 
 
First, European experience fosters a culture of dialogue. After 
all, the move toward works councils, supervisory boards, code-
determination, and so forth is predicated on a basis of “dialogue” 
as opposed to one of an adversarial nature. It seems only natural 
then, that discussion over new mechanisms for achieving corporate 
social responsibility would emanate from this type of industrial 
relations system. Second, in contrast, in the United States there is 
no basis for social dialogue. Indeed, under the structure of the U.S. 
labor law, IFA’s may not, in general, be considered to constitute a 
mandatory subject for bargaining, and therefore, it is difficult to 
“compel” a company to negotiate them. Third, in the United States, 
many employers are opening hostile to unions; and, for the most 
part, the legal institution of social dialogue does not exist. And, 
                                                          
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. at 188. 
10
 Id.  
11
 See Framework Agreements, supra note 1. While a small number of  non-
European companies do have IFAs, many of them carry the same weaknesses of 
European IFAs. 
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fourth, U.S. workers and their unions do not share certain 
protections enjoyed by many of their European counterparts 
concerning health care, retirement security, job security, and 
benefits. These kinds of issues presumably take priority for many 
U.S. workers over IFAs, in discussions with an employer.
12
   
 
 
II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL IFA 
 
In order to be fully effective, IFAs must adequately incorporate four 
fundamental elements: content (including standards), coverage, 
implementation and enforcement.
13
   
 
A. Content 
 
Content is the most complicated of the essential elements.  It is 
absolutely critical IFAs contain clear, and comprehensive labor standards 
that will apply anywhere in the world that the company operates. Not just 
any definition of these standards will do. These standards should be 
consistent with those developed by the International Labor Organization 
(“ILO”), an agency of the United Nations. The ILO is, perhaps, the most 
credible international organization when it comes to defining 
internationally-recognized labor standards for two reasons. First, the 
highest body of the ILO Conference is tripartite in nature, composed of 
equal numbers of employer, labor, and governmental representatives.
14
 
Second, it takes two-thirds of the ILO governing body, the International 
Conference, to adopt a standard known as a convention.
15
  ILO standards 
also are accompanied by jurisprudence and interpretations furnished 
through a committee structure that includes the Freedom of Association 
Committee, the Committee of Experts, and the Committee on Applications 
and Standards.
16
 ILO conventions are uniquely qualified to serve as 
                                                          
12
 Id. at 191. 
13
 Id. at 192-207. 
14
 Constitution of the International Labour Organization, 62 Stat. 3485, 15 U.N.T.S. 
35, art. 7 [hereinafter “ILO Constitution”] (stating that the fifty-six members of the 
Governing body consists of twenty-eight representatives of governments, fourteen 
representatives of employers, and fourteen representatives of employees). 
15
 Id. at art. 19(2). 
16
 Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/ 
applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-on-freedom-of-
association/lang--en/index.htm  (last visited Mar. 13, 2013); Committee of Experts on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ 
global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-of-
experts-on-the-application-of-conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013); Conference Committee on Applications and Standards, 
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international labor standards, given the vigorous process for developing, 
adopting, and interpreting them. 
To date, 189 conventions have been ratified by the ILO. Eight of these 
conventions are referred to as core labor standards.
17
 They include 
prohibitions on forced labor, discrimination, and child labor, as well as 
freedom of association and collective bargaining. It is absolutely essential 
that the content of an IFA includes these core standards and explicitly 
reference the relevant ILO conventions and accompanying jurisprudence 
such as decisions and comments made by the ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association. Specific references to the ILO’s core labor standards are 
key to ensuring that labor standards in the IFA are not vague, ambiguous, 
or subject to different interpretations and that they can be implemented 
consistently without misunderstandings.  
The content of an IFA must be uniform wherever the company operates.  
Some companies would like to apply IFAs on a “sliding scale” for 
operations in countries like China where internationally recognized core 
labor standards do not exist. This kind of disparate application of the 
content of an IFA must be resisted, “[A]fter all, how can a corporation 
claim that it is honoring international labor standards when its IFA cannot 
be applied to one of the world’s largest and fastest growing economies?”18 
Notably, in other countries like the United States, which have not ratified 
the ILO Conventions concerning freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, national law falls short of meeting internationally recognized 
labor standards.
19
 In particular, the lawful use of permanent striker 
replacements during a labor dispute, prohibitions against secondary 
                                                          
ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-
standards/conference-committee-on-the-application-of-standards/lang--en/index.htm 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013).  
17
 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948, 
July 9, 1948, ILOLEX No. C87, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C087; Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, 
July 1, 1949, ILOLEX No. C98, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C098; the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, June 28, 1930, ILOLEX 
No. C29, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C029; the Abolition 
of Forced Labour Convention, 1957, June 25, 1957, ILOLEX No. C105, available at 
http:// www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C105; the Equal Remuneration 
Convention, 1951, June 29, 1951, ILOLEX No. C100, available at http:// 
www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C100; the Discrimination (Employment and 
Occupation) Convention, 1958, June 25, 1958, ILOLEX No. C111, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C111; the Minimum Age Convention, 
1973, June 26, 1973, ILOLEX No. C138, available at http:// www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C138; and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999, June 17, 
1999, ILOLEX No. C182, available at http:// www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?C182. 
18
 Path, supra note 2, at 198. 
19
 Id. 
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activities, and other limitations on the right to strike raise serious questions 
regarding U.S. compliance with the freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining.
20
 IFAs that carve out countries like the United States, 
which do not comply with ILO standards, present doubts about the IFA’s 
commitment to changing corporate behavior.
21
 Workers throughout the 
world, whether they work in the United States, China, South Africa, 
Colombia,  or anywhere else, deserve the full application and enforcement 
of fundamental human rights, regardless of national labor law. 
Thus, it is entirely inadequate for an IFA to merely obligate its 
signatories to national or local laws, as it exemplifies the problems of the 
sliding scale approach. “This is a fundamental issue that distinguishes IFAs 
from codes of conduct, and for labor groups goes to the core of an IFAs 
credibility. It makes little sense from a labor group’s perspective to 
negotiate an agreement with a company that sets forth standards that it is 
already required to honor through national law. Such an IFA would be 
tantamount to negotiating an agreement that obligates a corporation to obey 
already-existing laws.”22 
 
B. Coverage 
 
In addition to incorporating clear international labor standards, it is 
critical that IFAs contain effective coverage provisions. They must be 
broad enough to “cover the entire enterprise, including subsidiaries, 
suppliers, and joint ventures.”23 Coverage must be broad to ensure the 
integrity of the agreement as global supply chains continue to expand. 
Broad coverage is also necessary to ensure that the increased use of 
contract work and other forms of domestic outsourcing do not allow 
corporations to escape the commitments that they have made under the 
agreement. An IFAs failure to cover all employees raises serious issues: 
 
“It is not difficult to imagine the skepticism of an outsourced 
employee (as well as the general public) who is not covered by an 
IFA, particularly when working alongside an employee of the 
company who is covered by the IFA. Such a situation is untenable 
and its mere possibility raises serious questions regarding the 
integrity of the IFA.”24   
 
                                                          
20
 See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (2004) 
(providing a new edition of the 2000 Human Rights Watch report). 
21
 Path, supra note 2, at 198. 
22
 Id. at 197. 
23
 Id. at192. 
24
 Id. 
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C. Implementation 
 
Even if an IFA has significantly broad coverage and detailed content that 
explicitly contains the ILO’s core labor standards it will not be effective if 
it is not implemented in a meaningful way.
25
 Meaningful implementation of 
an IFA requires both communication and educational activities.
26
 With 
respect to communication, IFAs must be written in a manner that can be 
understood by the average worker—regardless of the country that the 
corporation or its suppliers operates. Educational activities are also key to 
effective implementation of IFAs. Many of the concepts regarding 
fundamental human rights, like the freedom and of association and 
collective bargaining or discrimination are complicated concepts which 
require a basic understanding. All levels of management, workers, and 
suppliers must receive training to understand these standards and, 
specifically, the many ways in which they apply in the workplace. 
 
D. Enforcement 
 
If an IFA is not enforced, it will have little relevance to workers it 
intends to protect. This means that enforcement must provide a deterrent 
and, when necessary, provide remedies that will have an impact on how the 
corporation proceeds with respecting the agreed to terms of the IFA.
27
 It is 
critical that a dispute resolution mechanism also be provided when a 
complaint that the IFA remains unresolved. Binding arbitration and other 
forms of effective dispute resolution are essential to ensure the integrity of 
the process. 
In order for enforcement to work it must be transparent. Monitoring is a 
critical tool for ensuring transparency.
28
 For monitoring to be effective, it 
must utilize independent monitors such as trade unions and other NGOs 
who have familiarity with labor relations.
29
 It is also necessary that the 
monitoring process receive adequate resources so that it can be 
accomplished in an effective manner. In the spirit of transparency, the 
procedures for monitoring should also be agreed to and publicized making 
certain that employees and or their representatives know how to file claims 
and will be guaranteed an independent response to their complaints in a 
timely fashion.   
 
 
                                                          
25
 Id. at  201-202. 
26
 Id. 
27
 Id. at 202-203. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
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III.  INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
SIEMENS AG THE CENTRAL WORKS COUNCIL OF SIEMENS AG, 
THE IG METALL AND THE INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION 
 
On July 25, 2012, the Central Works Council of Siemens AG, IG Metall 
(the German metalworkers union) and IndustriALL Global Union entered 
into an international framework agreement with Siemens AG.
30
 The 
agreement is typical of many IFAs. It addresses matters related to content, 
coverage, and implementation. It also provides for a process when 
allegations have been made by one of the signatories that the IFA has been 
violated. Like many IFAs, although the Siemens IFA references these 
matters, it falls short of meeting the essential elements previously 
discussed. Among other things, it fails to clearly adopt the ILO convention 
concerning the freedom of association and does not contain a binding 
dispute resolution mechanism. These failings presented serious challenges 
during a union organizing drive at one of its U.S. facilities.   
The preamble to the Seimens IFA states: 
 
 With this background Siemens accordingly accepts the social 
responsibility principles referred to and explicitly acknowledges 
the fundamental employee rights defined in the relevant 
international conventions, the fundamental conventions of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) . . . [including] freedom 
of association and collective bargaining . . . . The international 
dialogue has to respect and balance both the local legal 
requirements and processes of every jurisdiction as well as the 
diversity and global presence of Siemens . . . .
31
 
 
Section 2.4 of the agreement entitled “Freedom of Association and the 
right to collective bargaining” states: 
 
The right of employees to form labour unions, join existing 
labour unions and conduct collective negotiations is 
acknowledged. Members of employee organizations or unions 
will be neither advantaged nor disadvantaged on account of their 
membership (see principles of ILO Conventions 87 and 98). A 
constructive approach will be taken to cooperation with 
employees, employee representatives and unions on the basis of 
                                                          
30
International Framework Agreement between Siemens AG the Central Works 
Council of Siemens AG, the IG Metall and the IndustriALL Global Union, available at 
http://www.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/siemens-gfa-
2012-english_final_0.pdf [hereinafter referred to as “Seimens IFA”]. 
31
 Id. at Section 1. 
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local law. Even in contentious disputes, the continuing objective 
will be to maintain effective constructive cooperation and to seek 
solutions with the aim of balancing our commercial interests and 
the interest of our employees.  
 
If the level of protection granted to employees in a country in 
which Siemens operates fails to essentially reflect these 
principles, Siemens will nevertheless apply these higher standards 
to its employees.
32
 
 
The Siemen's IFA references the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, but qualifies these references by stating merely that the 
company “acknowledges” these rights.33 But what does acknowledging 
these rights actually mean? After all, a company can acknowledge rights 
and then choose to narrowly interpret and apply them or ignore them 
altogether. The Siemen's IFA also states that it “accepts the social 
responsibility principles” referenced in ILO conventions.34 Again, however, 
it does not specify what acceptance of these principles actually commits the 
company to honoring. One argument is that obligating a company to 
honoring principles is not the same as honoring the conventions 
themselves. For example, a company can recognize the right of its 
employees to form their own union without adhering to the actual rights 
reflected by the ILO’s Convention on Freedom of Association.   
The Siemens agreement also states the need to respect local requirements 
while requiring the company to apply higher standards to its own 
employees if the company operates in a country that “fails essentially to 
reflect these principles.”35 Does this mean that the Company’s operations in 
countries that do not respect freedom of association and collective 
bargaining will implement these fundamental human rights? Will it mean 
that the Company will recognize a legitimate independent union, even if 
the union is not recognized under its own national or local laws? 
The Seimens IFA fails to satisfy the essential elements for an IFA by not 
clearly adopting the rights reflected in actual ILO conventions and 
accompanying jurisprudence. This failure left the signatories to the 
agreement with different interpretations of its meaning and application. 
Like other IFAs that contained similar flaws, it did not take long for a 
dispute to arise under the Siemens IFA.
36
 An organizing drive to represent 
Siemens employees at one of its sites in the United States was met with an 
                                                          
32
 Id. at Section 2.4. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. 
36
 See e.g. Path, supra note 2, at 198-199 (describing a dispute between an 
anonymous employer and union that emerged shortly after the creation of an IFA). 
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anti-union campaign.
37
 In one letter sent to an employee, the Company 
made its position on the union effort known: 
 
I want to take this opportunity to emphasize that Siemens does 
not believe a union is in the best interest of our employees here . . . 
. The reason is two-fold: Unions haven’t delivered on their 
promises and unionized employers can have difficulty being 
competitive in today’s global economy. We believe our futures are 
better served by working together toward a common goal, without 
interference from an outside third party concerned about its own 
interests. We believe we can accomplish more and we can compete 
better in securing ours for . . . [this] facility if we work together, 
one-on-one and in teams without unions.
38
 
 
In a letter to Siemens AG, IndustriALL’s General Secretary, Jyrki Raina 
listed numerous allegations indicating anti-union conduct on behalf of the 
company, including threats to employees.
39
 He noted that the union had 
filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board 
and expressed concern that the actions by Siemens management 
enumerated in the letter violated the IFA.
40
 Raina referenced language in 
the IFA concerning the company’s acknowledgement of the rights of 
employees to form labor unions, the objective of constructive cooperation 
in contentious disputes, and provisions regarding the need for Siemens to 
honor higher standards when it operates in a country that does not reflect 
the principles of freedom of association.  
Siemens’ response to IndustriAll’s allegations reaffirmed the company’s 
commitment to core labor standards and basic employee rights, including 
the right to bargain collectively through freely chosen representatives.
41
 It 
denied that its actions were in violation of the IFA by maintaining that it 
had not violated local labor laws by its conduct, stating, “By respecting the 
legal rights of employees to choose if they wish to be represented by and/or 
associated with a union and by complying with local legal requirements, 
Siemens is acting both within the letter and the spirit of the IFA.”42 
Is Seimen’s response denying the allegations that its actions are in 
violation of the IFA the end of the complaint process?  The   Siemens IFA 
                                                          
37
 See John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the ‘Union Free’ Movement in the 
U.S.A. Since the 1970’s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 197-214 (2008). 
38
 Letter from Siemens to Siemens employees (July 24, 2012) (on file with author). 
39
 Letter from Jyrki Raina, General Secretary, IndustriALL Global Union, to  
Siemens AG (Aug. 24, 2012) (on file with author). 
40
 Id. 
41
 Letter from Siemens AG, to Jyrki Raina, General Secretary, IndustriALL Global 
Union (Aug. 29, 2012) (on file with author). 
42
 Id. 
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provides that the resolution of grievances “should first exhaust the internal 
and local/national complaint and arbitration facilities.”43 The fault with this 
approach is that if national law does not meet international labor standards, 
as is the case with respect to some aspects of U.S. labor law, then 
exhaustion of national complaint mechanisms may not result in the 
satisfaction of the terms of the IFA. In such a circumstance, the alternative 
for resolution provided under the Seimens IFA lies with the Central Works 
Council, which “has the task of . . . advising on suitable measures . . . .” 
including “pursuing serious reports and complaints that cannot be resolved 
through the local and national complaint and arbitration facilities . . . .”.44   
Under the Seimens IFA, however, no provisions providing for binding 
arbitration from a neutral party are included. This raises the question of 
whether there is any effective recourse for signatories that claim the 
company violated the IFA. What authority does the works council have to 
resolve the dispute, or at the very least direct the dispute to a neutral party? 
If the ultimate decision regarding the outcome of the dispute rests with the 
Company, then how seriously will local management and workers take the 
IFA? Without clear answers to these questions, and a final resolution of the 
dispute, confidence in the IFA is greatly diminished. Moreover, instead of 
creating good will through an IFA, the IFA may be the source of frustration 
and resentment because it has created such high expectations.
45
  
These are especially poignant questions and comments not only for the 
Seimens IFA, but for all IFAs. They are not intended to denigrate existing 
IFAs but to emphasize the importance of negotiating IFAs that are strong, 
effective and that can fulfill the objective of changing corporate behavior 
when it comes to respecting international labor standards. 
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BETWEEN IKEA 
AND THE BUILDING WOODWORKERS INTERNATIONAL 
 
The Global Framework Agreement between IKEA and the Building and 
Wood Workers’ International (“BWI”) was entered into in 1998, with what 
was then known as the International Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers, BWI’s successor. The agreement was further developed in 
                                                          
43
 Seimens IFA, supra note 32, at Section 2.10.5. 
44
 Id. 
45
 See Siemens Anti-Union Campaign Bullies Workers Out of Organizing, 
INDUSTRIALL UNION (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.industriall-union.org/siemens-anti-
union-campaign-bullies-workers-out-of-organizing; see also, Path, supra note 2, at 205 
(noting that modern communication can make the failure of an IFA even more well-
known, and therefore more pronounced). 
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2001 and is now known as the IKEA Way on Purchasing Home Furnishing 
Products.
46
 
The agreement addresses three of the four major elements that are 
required for a successful framework agreement: coverage, content and 
implementation. With respect to coverage, the agreement includes 
suppliers, which “must comply with national laws and regulations and with 
international conventions . . . .”47 The IKEA Agreement also specifically 
references labor standards. It states that the framework agreement, “is 
based on eight core conventions defined” by the 1998 ILO Declaration of 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights, and other human rights instruments.
48
 The agreement 
further provides that suppliers “must comply with international conventions 
concerning social and working conditions.”49 The agreement explains that 
these conditions include “not preventing workers from associating freely 
with any workers’ association or group of their choosing or collective 
bargaining.”50 
The agreement includes a provision for implementation. It states that 
“suppliers shall effectively communicate to all its sub-suppliers, as well as 
to its own co-workers, the content of the IKEA Way on Purchasing Home 
Furnishing Products.”51 However, there does not appear to be a provision 
educating local management and workers about the actual international 
rights reflected by the eight ILO conventions referenced in the agreement.  
The IKEA agreement, notably, does not have any provision which 
addresses enforcement. Consequently, there is no recourse for the parties 
when there are different interpretations of the agreement.  The agreement 
does contain language concerning the formation of a “global compliance 
and monitoring group.”52 The language is vague, however, and does not 
provide for a dispute resolution mechanism, such as arbitration. 
The strength of the IKEA Way agreement was tested in 2008 by the 
North American trade union, the International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”). In 2006, the IAM learned that 
Swedwood, a subsidiary of IKEA, would be opening a manufacturing 
facility in Danville, Virginia, to supply IKEA with wood products.
53
 The 
union immediately began working with BWI and the Swedish union, GS, 
which represents Swedwood workers in Sweden, for assistance in its 
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organizing campaign. The IAM had hoped that the framework agreement 
was an indication that Swedwood would be neutral during its organizing 
campaign by not engaging in negative, anti-union, activities.
54
   
  Efforts were made at the earliest stages of the organizing campaign to 
meet with the Company under the auspices of the agreement and to 
reaffirm what BWI, GS, and the IAM understood to be the company’s 
commitments regarding freedom of association, which they believed 
encompassed neutrality.
55
 After the facility was operational, producing 
wood products for IKEA, a meeting was scheduled in Danville, Virginia. 
Participants were to include the IAM, the General Secretary of BWI and a 
representative from the Swedish unions.
56
 The meeting was eventually held 
under protest, without the IAM’s participation. 
Throughout the campaign, calls for Swedwood to honor the framework 
agreement were made by numerous union representatives in the U.S. and 
abroad.
57
 Despite these efforts, the company conducted an anti-union 
campaign, hiring a law firm “which has made its reputation keeping unions 
out of companies.”58 Per-Olof Sjoo, the President of GS who visited with 
Swedwood’s workers in Danville, commented: “The most consistent theme 
I believe was the fear factor. Partly, people dare not openly support the 
union.” Adding her thoughts on the situation at Swedwood, International 
Trade Union Confederation President, Sharan Burrow, noted, “Clearly all 
is not well at this factory . . . IKEA is taking advantage of the lax US 
workers protection.”59 
The IAM’s efforts did not rest exclusively on the strength of the 
framework agreement. It received national interest in the press and media 
at home and in Sweden. For example, the campaign received attention from 
The Daily Show and a prominent news program in Sweden.
60
 Several 
thousand support letters from workers all over the world were delivered to 
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Swedwood’s workers prior to the election.61    The campaign proved to be a 
success and the IAM easily won the NLRB election in 2011.
62
 
Even though the framework agreement did not keep Swedwood from 
engaging in an anti-union campaign, it did provide the basis for dialogue 
between the Company and BWI. Through this dialogue, the IAM was able 
to convey its concerns over Swedwood’s behavior to IKEA’s top level 
management. Additionally, it provided a forum for representatives of BWI 
and the Swedish union representing Swedwood workers to meet with the 
Company in Danville. It also may have influenced Swedwood in 
subsequent collective bargaining negotiations. Swedwood and the IAM 
reached a collective bargaining agreement without controversy for the 
Danville workers in a timely fashion.
63
    
Outside the U.S., the IKEA framework agreement was an important 
factor in the recent conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement 
between nearly 9,000 workers in Poland and Swedwood.
64
 As Ambet 
Yuson, the General Secretary of BWI commented: 
 
The success in Poland is clearly an example of the need for 
dialogue and engagement at both the national and international 
level . . . . While the unions in Poland were negotiating with the 
management in Poland, we were in discussions with the IKEA 
management at the global level to provide the necessary support. 
In the case of Poland, it was evident to s [sic] from the beginning 
that IKEA wanted to have an amicable conclusion as soon as 
possible. We look forward to working with IKEA to address 
concerns of [workers.]” 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
  
IFAs can change corporate behavior in the global workplace. Their 
effectiveness depends on whether the four essential elements described in 
the beginning of this article are adequately included in the agreement.  
When the content of agreements does not clearly incorporate international 
labor standards as reflected by ILO Conventions and accompanying 
jurisprudence, they are subject to different interpretations and often mired 
in dispute. Likewise, if an IFA is implemented without proper training 
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about the standards it imposes or if it is not distributed along with 
comprehensible information in a timely fashion, covered managers and 
workers may not understand the standards that are supposed to be enforced. 
Additionally, if IFAs do not cover suppliers, growing global supply chains 
will make them irrelevant. Lastly, if the IFA is not enforceable through a 
dispute resolution mechanism, like binding arbitration, the parties’ 
differences will most likely remain unresolved, frustrating them and greatly 
reducing the value of the IFA.  
  The Seimens IFA illustrates this problem. It failed to include a 
binding enforcement mechanism. As a result, when differences emerged 
over its interpretation, the union was left with no recourse under the IFA. It 
was also left with many questions about the ability of the IFA to change the 
company’s behavior towards union organizing efforts in the United States.
 The IKEA IFA also comes up short due to its lack of an enforcement 
mechanism. The success of the union at Swedwood (a supplier to IKEA 
covered by its IFA) was built on social dialogue with IKEA management, a 
global union federation (BWI), and its Swedish unions. This social 
dialogue was enhanced by the IFA. The lack of enforcement was offset to 
some extent by a global campaign to change the company’s behavior.   
 While social dialogue can be helpful, IFAs do more than provide a 
mechanism for dialogue. They must provide a stand-alone, binding 
commitment by a corporation to change its behavior towards the 
application of international labor standards wherever it operates in the 
world, including, of course, the United States.  In order to do so, IFAs must 
fully incorporate the essential elements previously described.  
